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ARTICLES
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Christopher S. Dadak *
INTRODUCTION
Continuing in the rich vein of prior Annual Surveys, this article
examines developments in Virginia civil procedure and practice in
the past year.' The survey includes a discussion of the relevant
decisions from the Supreme Court of Virginia, changes to appli-
cable rules of practice or procedure, and new legislation, which
will likely affect the practice of a civil practitioner in the Com-
monwealth of Virginia.
I. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
A. Nonsuits and Contractual Statutes of Limitation
This first discussed case shook the common understanding of
the power of nonsuits. Most practitioners would have likely, upon
questioning, guessed that a nonsuit tolled all statutes of limita-
tions. However, the Supreme Court of Virginia held otherwise. As
will be discussed in Part III.A, this decision and its significant
impact was ultimately abrogated by statute.
* Associate, Guynn & Waddell, P.C., Salem, Virginia. J.D., 2012, University of
Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2008, Washington and Lee University. The author thanks
the editors and staff of the University of Richmond Law Review for their hard (and under-
rated) work and particularly Stephanie Serhan for bringing this "book" to fruition.
1. Due to the publishing schedule, the applicable "year" is roughly July 2015 through
June 2016.
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In March 2010, water pipes in the residence of Jennifer Ploutis
burst and damaged the home and her belongings.! Ploutis had a
homeowner insurance policy through Allstate.3 While Allstate
made some payments, the parties ultimately disagreed as to the
total cost of repairs to which Ploutis was entitled.4 The original
complaint for breach of contract was filed on March 16, 2012.' Ul-
timately, Ploutis nonsuited and the court entered the correspond-
ing order on February 22, 2013.6 Ploutis then refiled her com-
plaint on August 21, 2013. 7
The Allstate policy in question was construed as a fire insur-
ance policy under Title 38.2, Chapter 21 of the Virginia Code.' As
such it must include certain standard policy form provisions un-
der the Virginia Code or a "simplified and readable policy of in-
surance" that is "in no respect less favorable to the insured."9 The
standard policy language states: "[n]o suit or action on this policy
for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of
law or equity unless all the requirements of this policy shall have
been complied with, and unless commenced within two years next
after inception of the loss."" Regardless of whether an insurance
carrier chooses the specifically provided form provisions pursuant
to Virginia Code section 38.2-2105(A) or a "simplified and reada-
ble policy" that is also allowed under Virginia Code section 38.2-
2107, "a two-year limitations period is the minimum period al-
lowed for fire insurance policies.""
The policy in question specifically provided:
No one may bring an action against us in any way related to the ex-
istence or amount of coverage, or the amount of loss for which the
coverage is sought, under a coverage for which Section I Conditions
applies, unless:
2. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ploutis, 290 Va. 266, 228, 776 S.E.2d 793, 794
(2015).
3. Id. at 228-29, 776 S.E.2d at 794.
4. Id. at 229, 776 S.E.2d at 794.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 230, 776 S.E.2d at 795.
9. Id. (citations omitted).
10. Id.
11. Id.
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a) there has been full compliance with all policy terms; and
b) the action is commenced within two years after the inception
of loss or damage.
Allstate demurred to Ploutis's refiled complaint on the basis
that more than two years had passed since the date of the loss. 3
The circuit court overruled Allstate's demurrer and Allstate ap-
pealed. 4
Relying on Massie v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, the
Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the circuit court's decision.
1
The crux of the issue, to the court, was whether the applicable
code sections, particularly Virginia Code section 38.2-2015, con-
stituted a "statute of limitations."'6 The circuit court considered
section 38.2-2015(A) to be "the Virginia statute of limitations for
fire insurance policies," which would then include the tolling pro-
visions pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-380."7 "The circuit
court then reasoned that even if the insurer used the simplified
and readable language permitted by Code § 38.2-2107, the tolling
provision inherent in Code § 38.2-2105 would still apply since the
policy language, without the tolling, would be less favorable to
the insured.' '
The Supreme Court of Virginia pointed out that "Code § 38.2-
2105(A), by its own language, is not a statute of limitations but
prescribes standard policy form provisions for fire insurance poli-
cies."'9 The court further clarified that section 38.2-2015(A) does
not serve as a bar to Ploutis's complaint or the basis of Allstate's
demurrer, but rather the basis of the demurrer was "Ploutis' fail-
ure to comply with the terms of the insurance contract."2 The use
of "substantively" similar policy language as required by statute,
did "not convert the contractual limitations period into a statute
of limitations., 2' "In short, neither Code § 38.2-2105 nor the con-
tractual period of limitations provided in Allstate's policy is a
12. Id. at 231, 776 S.E.2d at 795.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 231-32, 776 S.E.2d at 796 (citing Massie v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va.,
256 Va. 161, 165, 500 S.E.2d 509, 511 (1998)).
16. Id. at 232, 776 S.E.2d at 796.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 232 n.7, 776 S.E.2d at 796 n.7.
19. Id. at 232-33, 776 S.E.2d at 796.
20. Id. at 233, 776 S.E.2d at 796.
21. Id.
2016]
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'statute of limitations' within the meaning of Code § 8.01-
229(E)(3)" and "by incorporating a period of limitations into the
terms and conditions of their contract, 'the parties chose to ex-
clude the operation of the statute of limitations and ... its excep-
tions."'22 The insurance policy required that the action, with no
exceptions, must be commenced within two years of the loss, and
since the recommenced action was filed after two years since the
loss, Ploutis' action was time-barred.22
The implications of this decision were significant. Consider all
the suits that are related to a contract, e.g. insurance or labor and
employment suits. Once all these contracts contained a contrac-
tual statute of limitations, then the plaintiff would effectively be
unable to nonsuit the action once the contractual statute of limi-
tations had passed. As discussed in Part III.A, the General As-
sembly likely realized the significant impact and potential detri-
mental effect on a plaintiffs ability to bring and maintain an
action and amended the nonsuit statute accordingly.24
B. Nonsuit and Misnomer
In another case, decided in the same term as Ploutis, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia, in contrast, expanded the scope and
power of nonsuits. In full disclosure, the author and his prior firm
were involved in both the trial and appellate litigation of this
matter.
On April 12, 2009, Linda Richmond ("Richmond") was injured
in a motor-vehicle accident.25 The other driver, Katherine Craft
(at that time her maiden name and, after marriage, Katherine
Volk ("Volk")), was operating a motor vehicle belonging to Jean-
nie Cornett ("Cornett").26 As a permissive user, Volk was covered
by Cornett's insurance policy.27 On February 28, 2011, Richmond
filed a complaint against "Katherine Cornett."8 Richmond's coun-
sel did not provide a copy of the Complaint to the carrier until
April 13, 2011, which was more than two years after the acci-
22. Id. at 234, 776 S.E.2d at 797.
23. Id.
24. See infra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
25. Richmond v. Volk, 291 Va. 60, 62, 781 S.E.2d 191, 192 (2016).
26. Id. at 62-63 n.1, 781 S.E.2d at 192 n.1.
27. Id. at 63, 781 S.E.2d at 192.
28. Id.
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dent.29 Richmond, via counsel, unsuccessfully attempted to settle
the matter with the carrier and, in January 2012, requested ser-
vice on "Katherine Cornett."" However, Richmond's counsel pro-
vided Cornett's address as the address for service." On February
12, 2012, Volk filed a motion to quash service as it was invalid.32
Subsequent to that motion, Richmond nonsuited.3" Roughly a
month later, Richmond refiled her complaint naming "Katherine
E. Volk, flkia Katherine Craft, a/k/a Katherine E. Cornett."'4 Volk
then filed a special plea in bar asserting that the statute of limi-
tations barred Richmond's claim.35 The circuit court sustained the
special plea, holding that Katherine Volk "is not the same person
or entity as Katherine E. Cornett" and that Richmond's complaint
would not relate back under Virginia Code section 8.01-6."6 Rich-
mond appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
The Supreme Court of Virginia first analyzed whether the case
involved a misnomer or a misjoinder.37 The parties, on appeal,
had both argued under the analysis of a misnomer." "The deter-
mination of whether an incorrectly named party is a misnomer or
misjoinder is a question of law" and the court is "not bound by the
parties' agreement on this issue." 9 "The key distinction between a
misnomer and misjoinder is whether the incorrectly named party
in the pleading is, in fact, a correct party who has been sufficient-
ly identified in the pleadings."" The complaint must be taken as a
whole to determine how and if the plaintiff identifies a party.4 ' In
this particular case, "the facts laid out in the 2011 complaint es-
tablish that the intended defendant was the driver of a specific
vehicle that was in a specific location at a specific time and that
29. Id. at 62-63, 781 S.E.2d at 192. This fact is important in that Virginia Code sec-
tion 8.01-6 requires that for an amendment to relate back, the party or its agent must
have notice of the "institution of the action" within the statute of limitations. VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-6 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
30. Richmond, 291 Va. at 63, 781 S.E.2d at 192.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 64, 781 S.E.2d at 193.
37. Id. at 64-65, 781 S.E.2d at 192.
38. Id. at 64, 781 S.E.2d at 193.
39. Id. at 64-65, 781 S.E.2d at 193.
40. Id. at 65, 781 S.E.2d at 193.
41. Id.
20161
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the driver of that vehicle committed a specific act."42 According to
the court, "Volk [was] the only person that fitf this description,
[and] it is readily apparent that she was the person against whom
the action was intended to be brought."4 The court agreed with
the parties that Richmond's use of "Katherine Cornett" was a
misnomer.44
Volk argued that Virginia Code section 8.01-6 was the sole
mechanism to have the (in effect) amended pleading relate back
to the filing date of April 12, 2011. 4 ' Accordingly, Richmond's
"failure to correct the misnomer under Code § 8.01-6 prevent[ed]
Code § 8.01-229(E) from tolling the statute of limitations., 4' The
court rejected the argument and analogized the reasoning to
Clark v. Butler Aviation- Washington National, Inc.47 In Clark, the
plaintiff failed to serve the defendant within a year of filing suit
as required under Rule 3:5(e). 48 The plaintiff nonsuited and re-
filed against the same defendant. 4' The defendant successfully
pleaded a special plea of statute of limitations and Rule 3:5(e)."
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed."' The court
held that the tolling statute, service rule, and nonsuit statute
were given the most effect-true to their intent-if the nonsuit
statute essentially restarted the clock on the service rule. 2 Anal-
ogously, the failure to timely serve someone prevents a court from
entering an enforceable judgment against the defendant, just as
"the failure to correct a misnomer under Code § 8.01-6 may" pre-
vent the court from entering a proper judgment.5'3 But that "fail-
ure .. . does not prevent the operation of Code § 8.01-229(E)(3)
upon the taking of a nonsuit. ' 4 Section 8.01-229(E) tolls the stat-
ute of limitations when the identity of the parties remains the
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 65-66, 781 S.E.2d at 194.
46. Id. at 66, 781 S.E.2d at 194.
47. Id. (citing Clark v. Butler Aviation-Washington Nat'l, Inc., 238 Va. 506, 385
S.E.2d 847 (1989)).
48. Clark, 238 Va. at 508, 385 S.E.2d at 847 (at that time Rule 3:3(e)).
49. Id.
50. Id. (at that time Rule 3:3(e)).
51. Id. at 512, 385 S.E.2d at 850.
52. Id. at 511-12, 385 S.E.2d at 849-50.
53. Richmond v. Volk, 291 Va. 60, 66, 781 S.E.2d 191, 194 (2016).
54. Id. at 66-67, 781 S.E.2d at 194.
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same." "A misnomer... only speaks to the name of a party, not
the identity of a party."" However, when "the name of a party is
changed in a subsequent action for the purpose of correcting a
misnomer that existed in the initial action, there has been no
change in the identity of the parties."57 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that Virginia Code section 8.01-229(E) was satisfied, the
statute of limitations had been tolled, and Richmond's action
should be allowed to proceed. 8
Justice Kelsey, joined by Justice Goodwyn and Justice
McClanahan, authored a strong dissent to the majority's opin-
ion." The dissent was short and to the point. The dissent did not
find the reasoning in Clark relevant or analogous to the instant
case, and thus not persuasive." The dissent acknowledged that
Richmond most likely intended to sue Volk, but it was simply not
relevant to the analysis."' Richmond had sued "Katherine Cor-
nett" and, simply put, Cornett was not Volk.6' The nonsuit statute
required that the identity of the parties remain the same. The
dissent then pointed out that the language in Virginia Code sec-
tion 8.01-6--"[an] amendment changing the party against whom
a claim is asserted, whether to correct a misnomer or other-
wise"--expressly contemplates that the correction of a misnomer
changes the identity of a party."
This decision, as the dissent repeatedly points out, expands the
power of a nonsuit. The scope of this expansion is currently un-
clear. Furthermore, this opinion greatly restricts the relevance of
Virginia Code section 8.01-6. Instead of complying with the enu-
merated requirements of section 8.01-6, a plaintiff may now simp-
ly move for a nonsuit and refile against the correctly named de-
fendant, as long as the identity of the defendant(s) was
"sufficiently" described. In the instant case, the description and
identity of the defendant was simple in terms of the applicable
facts. It was obvious whom Richmond intended to sue. However,
55. Id. at 67, 781 S.E.2d at 194.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 67, 781 S.E.2d at 195.
59. Id. at 68, 781 S.E.2d at 195.
60. Id. at 71 n.8, 781 S.E.2d at 197 n.8.
61. Id. at 69, 781 S.E.2d at 195.
62. Id. at 68-69, 781 S.E.2d at 195.
63. Id. at 70, 781 S.E.2d at 196 (emphasis omitted).
2016]
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one can imagine (and many practitioners will face) cases where
the description could refer to multiple potential defendants and
the plaintiffs intended defendant could be much harder to assess.
C. Sanctions
The Supreme Court of Virginia issued several opinions on sanc-
tions. Sanctions, similar to malpractice, are the worst-case sce-
nario for every practitioner and the source of many sleepless
nights. However, practitioners can seek comfort in the fact that
out of the three cases discussed below, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia reversed and dismissed the award of sanctions in two of
them.
1. Refusing Additional Time to Answer
In this matter, the plaintiff, Environmental Specialist Inc.
("ESI") filed a complaint against multiple defendants, including
Wells Fargo Bank Northwest, N.A., Trustee ("Wells Fargo").' ESI
was seeking to enforce a mechanic's lien in the amount of
$24,449.30.65 Wells Fargo was served through the Secretary of the
Commonwealth and the accompanying certificate was filed with
the court on October 30, 2013.66 Counsel for Wells Fargo first re-
ceived the complaint on November 21, 2013, the deadline for the
answer.67 Wells Fargo's counsel immediately contacted counsel for
ESI and requested a short extension to file its responsive plead-
ing.68 Counsel for ESI refused the request.69 Wells Fargo filed a
motion for leave to file its answer on or before November 26,
2013, and in its relief also sought "fees and costs incurred with
regard to the motion."7 Some of the other defendants admitted to
the lien amount and an order to that effect was entered on Janu-
ary 2, 2014."' "Despite the entry of the [January 2, 2014] order, on
January 6, 2014, ESI filed a motion for default judgment against
64. Env't Specialist, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank Northwest, N.A., 291 Va. 111, 114, 782
S.E.2d 147, 148 (2016).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 114-15, 782 S.E.2d at 148.
68. Id. at 114, 782 S.E.2d at 148.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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all the defendants, because none of the defendants had filed a re-
sponsive pleading within the 21-day period afforded by Rule3:8. , 7
On February 3, 2014, the circuit court heard Wells Fargo's mo-
tion for leave to file an answer out of time and ESI's motion for
default judgment. 73 The circuit court granted Wells Fargo's mo-
tion and "ordered ESI's counsel to reimburse Wells Fargo's coun-
sel $1200 for 'fees and costs' incurred regarding the motion" with-
in thirty days of the order.4 Shortly thereafter, Wells Fargo (at
this point the sole defendant) and ESI advised the circuit court
that the matter had been resolved. The circuit court entered a
final order on February 18, 2014 that the January 2, 2014 order
and judgment had been satisfied and the award of $1200 in sanc-
tions against ESI was "for its failure to voluntarily extend the
time in which Wells Fargo might file its answer."76 The parties did
not have a court reporter present at the hearing, and, thus, no
transcript of the hearing was available for the Supreme Court of
Virginia to review.77 ESI submitted a written statement pursuant
to Rule 5:11(e), which was not signed by the presiding trial judge,
and to which Wells Fargo filed an objection.78
In its analysis, the Supreme Court of Virginia went through a
court's inherent powers to discipline attorneys appearing before
it. "A court's inherent power to discipline an attorney practicing
before it includes the power not only 'to remove an attorney of
record in a case,'. . . but also 'in a proper case to suspend or annul
the license of an attorney practicing in the particular court."'79
However, the court emphasized that, as it had previously held, a
court can financially discipline an attorney with fees or costs only
pursuant to specific authority of a statute or rule.8" "Absent the
authority granted by a statute or rule, 'a trial court's inherent
power to supervise the conduct of attorneys ... does not include
72. Id. at 114-15, 782 S.E.2d at 148.
73. Id. at 115, 782 S.E.2d at 148.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 116, 782 S.E.2d at 149 (citations omitted).
80. Id. (citations omitted).
2016]
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the power to impose as a sanction an award of attorneys' fees and
costs to the opposing party."'8'
The circuit court had not cited any statute or rule pursuant to
which it was awarding Wells Fargo its attorneys' fees and costs."
The Supreme Court of Virginia could not find a statute or rule
which supported such an award."3 Wells Fargo argued that ESI's
counsel was "unprofessional" in their refusal to extend the dead-
line and that "the sanctions award was clearly intended to edu-
cate Plaintiffs counsel as to the level of professionalism ... ex-
pected of counsel, as well as to reimburse [Wells Fargo] for the
unnecessary time and expense incurred" in having to argue its
motion.8 ' The Supreme Court of Virginia meticulously described
the efforts of the profession of law, which is self-regulating, to
promote and establish professionalism." While the court
acknowledged the importance of professionalism, "[i]t is im-
portant to recognize, however, that the principles of professional-
ism are aspirational, and, as we stated when this Court approved
their adoption, they 'shall not serve as a basis for disciplinary ac-
tion or for civil liability."'8 6
The court also emphasized that the principles of professional-
ism "recognize that conflicts may arise between an attorney's ob-
ligations to a client's best interests and the professional courtesy
of agreeing to an opposing counsel's request for an extension of
time."" In this case, the court noted that ESI had directed its
counsel not to agree to the extension. 8 'There is a difference be-
tween behavior that appropriately honors an attorney's obligation
to his client's best interest, behavior that falls short of aspira-
tional standards, and behavior that is subject to discipline and/or
sanctions.""
The Supreme Court of Virginia did not consider, in these cir-
cumstances, ESI counsel's behavior to be unprofessional or uneth-
81. Id. (citations omitted).
82. Id. Furthermore, Wells Fargo in its motion did not cite any authority for its re-
quested relief of fees and costs incurred. Id.
83. Id. at 116-17, 782 S.E.2d at 149.
84. Id. at 118, 782 S.E.2d at 150.
85. Id. at 118-20, 782 S.E.2d at 150-51.
86. Id. at 121, 782 S.E.2d at 151.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 121, 782 S.E.2d at 152.
89. Id.
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ical, which would have supported discipline.' Furthermore, even
if the conduct was sanctionable in substance, the trial court did
not have the authority to impose monetary sanctions.91
2. Improper Purpose
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the award of attor-
neys' fees in Kambis v. Considine. Mitchell Kambis ("Kambis"),
Elegant Homes of Virginia ("Elegant Homes"), and John Rolfe
Realty ("John Rolfe") appealed the trial court's award of sanctions
to April Considine ("Considine"), Patricia Wolfe, and Villa Deste,
LLC ("Villa Deste").92 At all relevant times, Kambis owned John
Rolfe and Elegant Homes. For twelve years, 1999 through 2011,
Kambis and Considine were in a romantic relationship.93 In 2000,
they formed, and were the sole members of, Villa Deste, a real es-
tate development business.94 Considine's mother, Patricia Wolfe,
thereafter loaned money to Villa Deste for both the purchase of
real estate and also the construction of a home where Kambis and
Considine lived.9 "By 2006, Villa Deste had acquired significant
real estate holdings .... "96
In December 2005, Kambis and Considine executed an "As-
signment of Membership Interest" by which Kambis, "for value
received," assigned all of his Interest in Villa Deste (and its as-
sets) to Considine. Considine was now the sole owner and mem-
ber of Villa Deste.97 At some point after this assignment, their
romantic relationship ended.98 In 2009, Kambis, Elegant Homes,
and John Rolfe ("Kambis Parties") filed suit against Considine,
her mother Patricia Wolfe, and Villa Deste ("Considine Parties").9
The Kambis parties also recorded a memorandum of lis pendens
on the real property owned by Villa Deste, including the home
where Kambis and Considine had lived together. 00 After the de-
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Kambis v. Considine, 290 Va. 460, 462, 778 S.E.2d 117, 120 (2015).
93. Id. at 462, 778 S.E.2d at 118.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 463, 778 S.E.2d at 118.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 463, 778 S.E.2d at 118-19.
98. Id. at 463, 778 S.E.2d at 119.
99. Id.
100. Id.
2016]
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fendants filed responsive pleadings demurring to the allegations,
the Kambis parties sought and received leave to file an amended
complaint.1 ' The Kambis parties "alleged nineteen claims against
the Considine parties, including fraud, defamation, unjust en-
richment, replevin, battery, enforcement of a mechanic's lien, in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, and a number of deriva-
tive claims."'' The Considine parties demurred, filed a special
plea, and also moved for sanctions."3 Following a hearing on the
matter, the trial court "dismissed fourteen of the nineteen claims
with prejudice." ' 4 The circuit court also released the lis pen-
dens.105
In March 2013, the Kambis parties filed a third amended com-
plaint "raising the claims that had not been dismissed previously,
including claims for fraud, replevin, battery, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and unjust enrichment."'0 6 Close to trial, the
Kambis parties' counsel withdrew.0 ' Other issues and complica-
tions arose as to the trial and Kambis (individually) proceeding
pro se, including a dispute whether Kambis's fraud claim was
dismissed with prejudice or without. 0 8 In January 2014, the
Kambis parties recorded a new memorandum of lis pendens on
the same properties as before and filed a motion to vacate the
2012 order releasing the lis pendens.' °
Although the circuit court vacated the 2012 order (and rein-
stated Kambis' fraud claim), it heard argument on the Considine
parties' motion for sanctions."0 The Considine parties were seek-
ing $137,819.61 in attorney's fees from Kambis and his original
counsel and $83,505.62 from Kambis individually."' Several
weeks after the argument, the Kambis parties nonsuited all of
their remaining claims."' Ten days later, the circuit court granted
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 464, 778 S.E.2d at 119. "After further demurrers, special pleas in bar, and
motions for summary judgment were filed, the court subsequently dismissed the replevin
claim." Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 464-65, 778 S.E.2d at 119-20.
110. Id. at 465, 778 S.E.2d at 120.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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the motion for sanctions and sanctioned the Kambis parties and
their original counsel in the amount of $64,319.38 and Kambis
individually in the amount of $84,541.61.113 Kambis appealed the
sanctions.
Kambis's appeal focused on two arguments to reverse the
award. First, Kambis argued that the "record demonstrate[d] that
his fraud claim was well grounded in law and fact, as it had sur-
vived demurrers, special pleas in bar, and a motion for summary
judgment." 4 He also argued that sanctions were not appropriate
or authorized under Virginia Code section 8.01-271.1 because
"there is a distinction to be drawn between bringing an action or
making a filing for the purpose of intimidating the opposing party
and bringing an action or making a filing for an improper pur-
pose.,115
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with Kambis on the first
argument, but rejected his argument regarding an improper pur-
pose under section 8.01-271.1.116 "The trial court found that Kam-
bis was pursuing his claims in a manner that demonstrated he
was less interested in vindicating his legal rights and more inter-
ested in intimidating and injuring Considine.""' 7 The court also
listed several facts in the record that reflected Kambis's intent
and specific knowledge of the expense of the litigation."'s The Su-
preme Court of Virginia strongly stated that "a claim brought for
such vengeful and vindictive reasons is brought for an improper
purpose under Code § 8.01-271.1. ' 9 The court did clarify that all
suits are "in some way, intimidating.' 2 Intimidation as a "collat-
eral effect" is not sanctionable, but when a pleading or suit is filed
"primarily to intimidate the opposing party," then the action
crosses tne line into sanctionable conduct.''
113. Id.
114. Id. at 466, 778 S.E.2d at 120.
115. Id. A lawyer is in trouble when forced to argue that intimidating a party is not an
improper purpose.
116. Id. at 467, 778 S.E.2d at 121.
117. Id. at 468, 778 S.E.2d at 121.
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 469 n.3, 778 S.E.2d at 122 n.3.
121. Id.
2016]
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3. Submitting Improper Jury Instructions
In Ragland v. Soggin, the Supreme Court of Virginia vacated
the award of $200 sanctions by the circuit court against defense
counsel.2 ' The sanctions were based on improper jury instruc-
tions that were initially provided to the jury.
The plaintiff was the administrator of the estate of a decedent
who had taken horse-riding lessons from an instructor.123 The
claim alleged that the instructor was "negligent in providing
training and instruction... and in failing to select an appropriate
horse for [the decedent] to ride." '124 The defense's theory of the cas-
es centered on an interpretation of Virginia Code section 3.2-6203
that required that the alleged negligence be the "sole cause" of
the alleged injury and in this case, death. 12 ' Defense counsel
drafted jury instructions with that theory in mind and amended
the typical issues and findings instructions to state "sole cause"
instead of "a proximate cause." '126
The circuit court rejected that interpretation and held that the
statute did not require that the negligence be the sole cause, but
merely a proximate cause.2 7 "Accordingly, defense counsel revised
the issues instruction to reflect the trial court's ruling, but appar-
ently neglected to revise the findings instruction.'2 8 Plaintiffs
counsel and the circuit court "had an opportunity to review the
findings instructions before the instructions were read to the ju-
ry," but no one noticed that "sole cause" remained in the instruc-
tion.129 The circuit court read the instructions to the jury and
again no one noticed the incorrect language.' 30 Before the written
instructions were provided to the jury, plaintiffs counsel then no-
ticed the mistake and the parties "used correction fluid to cover
up the word 'sole' and the phrase 'a proximate cause' was hand-
written on the typed version of the findings instruction that was
delivered to the jury. ' 13' The jury returned with a verdict in favor
122. Ragland v. Soggin, 291 Va. 282, 292, 784 S.E.2d 698, 703 (2016).
123. Id. at 284,784 S.E.2d at 699.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 284-85, 784 S.E.2d at 699.
130. Id. at 285, 784 S.E.2d at 699.
131. Id.
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of the defendant and the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict "assert[ing] that defense counsels'
misconduct in submitting the issues and findings instructions
tainted the jury."'32 In their response, defense counsel explained
how the instructions were originally drafted with their theory in
mind and that the "failure to change the language in the findings
instruction was inadvertent.""13 The circuit court awarded sanc-
tions and held that while "it was not a deliberate act to mislead
the court ... however, [it] does rise to the level of a sanctionable
act." '134 The trial court was "gravely concerned" as it was a "total
misrepresentation of the law under any circumstance.""' 5
The Supreme Court of Virginia referred to the previously dis-
cussed Environmental Specialist, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank
Northwest, N.A., decision and analogized, stating that "the trial
court in this case failed to identify the authority under which it
was sanctioning defense counsel.""' 6 Similarly, as in ESI, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia could not find a Rule of Court or statute
that would support awarding sanctions."7 Criminal contempt un-
der Virginia Code section 18.2-456 would not apply because "Vir-
ginia courts have required the element of intent in order to sus-
tain a criminal contempt conviction.""' The court also analyzed
the application of Virginia Code section 8.01-271.1 and found that
it did apply as "[s]ubmitting a jury instruction to a trial court and
asking that a particular instruction be given to a jury is the
equivalent of making an oral motion to the court.""' 9 However, the
circuit court had found defense counsel's actions to be "inadvert-
ent" and since "there is nothing in Code § 8.01-271.1 that gives a
trial judge authority to impose monetary sanctions on an attorney
for.., an inadvertent mistake," the Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed the circuit court's award of sanctions.4 '
132. Id. at 286, 784 S.E.2d at 700.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 287, 784 S.E.2d at 700.
135. Id. at 288, 784 S.E.2d at 700.
136. Id. at 289, 784 S.E.2d at 701 (citations omitted).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 290, 784 S.E.2d at 702.
139. Id. at 292, 784 S.E.2d at 703.
140. Id.
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D. Reinstating Case Under Virginia Code Section 8.01-335
This particular Supreme Court of Virginia decision will be near
and dear to the heart of every plaintiffs attorney who has had a
case lie buried, and perhaps forgotten, in a dusty corner or cabi-
net. In JSR Mechanical, Inc. v. Aireco Supply, Inc., the Supreme
Court of Virginia analyzed what, if any, discretion a circuit court
possesses in deciding a motion to reinstate a case that has been
dismissed under Virginia Code section 8.01-335 for being inactive
for more than three years.14 '
In July 2010, JSR Mechanical, Inc. ("JSR") filed suit against
Aireco Supply, Inc. ("Aireco") for breach of contract and negli-
gence.142 Aireco timely filed an answer in August 2010.' 3 No fur-
ther pleadings were filed by any party in 2010, 2011, 2012, or
2013. ' In January 2014, "the circuit court entered a final order
stating that the case had been pending for over three years with
no proceedings and was therefore discontinued and stricken from
the docket."'' On January 23, 2015, eight days before the dead-
line, JSR filed its motion to reinstate the proceeding and ex-
plained its lack of activity."6 The motion stated that Aireco had
allowed someone to make unauthorized purchases using JSR's
account. 1 7 That person was convicted of criminal charges in Mar-
yland and ordered to pay $35,000 in restitution to JSR."' Over
time, it became apparent to JSR that the likelihood of actually re-
covering through restitution was minimal, if not impossible. 4 9
Thus, JSR filed to reinstate the case so that it could recover that
amount from Aireco.
On January 30, 2015, the parties appeared and argued the mo-
tion to reinstate. That same day, the circuit court ruled and en-
tered an order denying the motion to reinstate as "just cause and
sufficient grounds do not exist for granting [the] motion.""' JSR
appealed the ruling.
141. 291 Va. 377, 786 S.E.2d 144 (2016).
142. Id. at 380, 786 S.E.2d at 145.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 380-81, 786 S.E.2d at 145.
146. Id. at 381, 786 S.E.2d at 145.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion included an interest-
ing analysis of the sufficiency of a record for appellate review. In
addition to the merits, Aireco opposed JSR's appeal on the
grounds that JSR did not file a transcript or written statement as
required under Rule 5:11.152 The court noted that Rule 5:11 is not
jurisdictional and since the appeal was purely on a matter of law,
as long as the manuscript record was sufficient, the lack of tran-
script or written statement was not necessarily fatal to JSR's ap-
peal. 3 The court found that the Final Order reflected the only
facts it needed to consider JSR's appeal: "that JSR met the time-
liness and notice requirements explicitly prescribed in Code §
8.01-335(B). 154
As to the meat of the appeal, whether a circuit court has discre-
tion to deny a motion to reinstate that which has otherwise met
the timeliness and notice requirements of section 8.01-335(B), the
Supreme Court of Virginia focused more on what language the
statute did not include and its legislative history."' The disputed
portion of the statute reads: "[a]ny case discontinued or dismissed
under the provisions of this subsection may be reinstated, on mo-
tion, after notice to the parties in interest, if known, or their
counsel of record within one year from the date of such order but
not after.""' 6
JSR and Aireco obviously had competing arguments as to the
meaning and significance of "may" in that section. Aireco argued
that "may," rather than "shall," signified that the circuit court
had discretion in deciding the motion.157 JSR argued that "may"
simply reflected the reality that not all plaintiffs would file for re-
instatement."5 Given these competing interpretations and that
the meaning of that portion was not plain in the context of the en-
tire subsection, the court found the statute to be ambiguous.
59
Thus, the court had to "apply the interpretation that will carry
152. Id.
153. Id. at 381, 786 S.E.2d at 146.
154. Id. at 382, 786 S.E.2d at 146.
155. Id. at 380, 786 S.E.2d at 145.
156. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-335(B) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
157. JSR Mechanical, Inc., 291 Va. at 382, 786 S.E.2d at 146.
158. Id. at 384, 786 S.E.2d at 147.
159. Id. The court did not include much analysis in its finding that the statute was
ambiguous. Id. However, it is an important conclusion-and a key step in judicial statute-
ry construction-and perhaps a signal that the court is expanding its willingness to con-
sider statutes ambiguous and delve into the intent behind them and their legislative his-
tory.
20161
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
out the legislative intent behind the statute."'' 0 The court found
two issues determinative in its analysis of the legislative intent.
First, the court counted that "good cause" appeared forty-six
times in Title 8.01, but the statute in dispute did not include the
phrase even once. 16 1 Second, and most importantly, the disputed
portion used to include "for cause" but this language was deleted
in 1999.162 The court found that the legislative history supported
the interpretation that once a plaintiff complies with the timeli-
ness and notice requirement, a circuit court has no discretion re-
garding the motion to reinstate and must grant it.
16 3
The deletion of "for cause" in 1999 certainly is instructive.
However, as Aireco, and other critics, will point out, it is hard to
reconcile the use of "may" (and how practitioners have become ac-
customed to interpreting its meaning) with the supreme court's
holding. After this decision, the circuit court must reinstate the
case upon a timely motion and timely notice to the parties in-
volved. Traditionally, practitioners, and judges as well, would
have expected to see the use of "shall" if the result or action was
mandatory. Furthermore, statutory construction may now be
more difficult for circuit court judges and attorneys. Now if you
see only "may" in a statute, you may need to check the legislative
history to make sure that a "for cause" or other requirement was
not previously included. It remains to be seen if other statutes
that use only the phrase "may" will be interpreted differently in
future cases or if this analysis will remain specific to the particu-
lar facts of this case, and the general preference that matters be
litigated on their merits rather than dismissed on technicalities.
II. AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF COURT
A. Compromise Offers and Conduct or Statements During
Negotiations
The court significantly amended Rule 2:408 of the Rules of the
Supreme Court of Virginia in October 2015."M Although eviden-
tiary in nature, this amendment will affect the daily practice of
160. Id. (quoting Kozmina v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 347, 349-50, 706 S.E.2d 860, 862
(2011)).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 385, 786 S.E.2d at 148; see also Act of Mar. 28, 1999, ch. 652, 1999 Va. Acts
652 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-335 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
163. JSR Mechanical, Inc., 291 Va. at 380, 786 S.E.2d at 145.
164. VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:408 (Supp. 2016).
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all civil litigation practitioners. Previously the rule had stated
that "[e]vidence of offers and responses concerning settlement or
compromise of any claim which is disputed as to liability or
amount is inadmissible regarding such issues."'' 5 The rule did
permit the admission of evidence as to "express admission of lia-
bility, or an admission concerning an independent fact pertinent
to a question in issue."'6 6 The rule has now been clarified to state
that evidence of "furnishing, promising, or offering" or "attempt-
ing to compromise the claim" and "conduct or any statement
made during compromise negotiations" is not admissible to "prove
or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim, or to im-
peach by a prior inconsistent statement or by contradiction."'6 7
The amended rule preserved the exception that such evidence
may be admitted "for another purpose, such as proving a wit-
ness's bias or prejudice, or negating a contention of undue de-
lay."'66 The amendment did add a subparagraph that expressly
clarified that evidence pre-existing the negotiations, including
pre-existing documents, are not rendered excludable "merely be-
cause such evidence was disclosed, produced, or discussed by a
party during such negotiations."'69 This amendment became effec-
tive on July 1, 2016."' The revised language fortifies protection
afforded to statements and conduct in settlement negotiations,
which should give practitioners increased comfort in candid and
substantive settlement discussions.
B. Attorney's Fees and Costs on Appeal as to Domestic Relations
In October 2015, Rule 5:35 was amended, and the attorney's
fees provision related to appeals to the Supreme Court of Virginia
was clarified with respect to domestic relations and other family
law proceedings. 7 ' The rule had previously stated that once an
appeal has been refused or dismissed, "any appellee who has re-
ceived attorney's fees and costs in the circuit court may make ap-
plication in the circuit court for additional fees and costs incurred
on appeal pursuant to Rule I:IA.""'
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. VA. SuP. CT. R. 5:35 (Supp. 2016).
172. Id.
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The new rule includes a new subsection specific to family law
proceedings. Under the new rule, in effect since January 1, 2016,
if attorney's fees are authorized by relevant statute (Title 16.1,
Title 20, or Title 63.2) then "a party may request an award of fees
incurred in the appeal ... by including a prayer for such recovery
in the Opening Brief or the Reply Brief of Appellant, or in the
Brief of Appellee."'' 3 Once that prayer has been made, "the Su-
preme Court may award to a party who has made such request,
all of their attorney fees, or any part thereof, or remand the is-
sue ... for a determination thereof."'' 4 Interestingly, the rule
specifies that the court may "include the fees incurred by such
party in pursuing fees as awarded in the circuit court."''
If the Supreme Court is determining the award of fees, then
the court "shall not be limited to a consideration of whether a
party's position on an issue was frivolous or lacked substantial
merit but shall consider all the equities of the case."'7 6 If the issue
is remanded to the circuit court, then the circuit court
shall consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to, the
extent to which the party was a prevailing party on the issues, the
nature of the issues involved, the time and labor involved, the finan-
cial resources of the parties, and the fee customarily charged in the
locality for similar legal services.
177
C. Incorporation of Facts or Argument from Prior Petitions
In an order dated October 7, 2015 and effective immediately,
the Supreme Court of Virginia amended rule 5:20 and codified
long-standing practice before the court regarding petitions for a
rehearing. 17 The amendment added subsection (e) which provides
"[a]ttempts to incorporate facts or arguments from the petition for
appeal or original jurisdiction petition are prohibited.' 19 The
long-standing practice before the court was not to include facts or
arguments from prior petitions. However, some practitioners,
particularly those with less experience before the Supreme Court
of Virginia, may have succumbed to the temptation to incorporate
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:20 (Supp. 2016).
179. Id.
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facts or arguments from the original petition in order to preserve
valuable space for the most salient facts and arguments. The new
rule expressly prohibits such attempts and provides written
guidance as to what was previously an unwritten long-standing
practice.
III. NEW LEGISLATION
A. Nonsuit Tolls Contractual Statutes of Limitation
As a direct response to the decision of Allstate v. Ploutis, the
General Assembly passed House Bill 441, which specifically pro-
vided that the nonsuit statute applies to and tolls contractual
statutes of limitations."' The Supreme Court of Virginia decided
Allstate v. Ploutis on September 17, 2015.11 On January 7, 2016,
House Delegate G. Manoli Loupassi introduced the bill."8 2 By Feb-
ruary 24, 2016, the bill passed both the House and Senate."' On
March 1, 2016, Governor Terry McAuliffe signed the bill and it
became effective as of July 1, 2016.1' The bill amended Virginia
Code section 8.01-229(E) to read that that when a "plaintiff suf-
fers a voluntary nonsuit ... the statute of limitations with re-
spect to such action shall be tolled by the commencement of the
nonsuited action, regardless of whether the statute of limitations
is statutory or contractual.""' The new statute directly abrogates
Allstate v. Ploutis, and now a nonsuit tolls both statutory and
contractual statutes of limitation.
B. Landlord-Tenant: 120 Days to Hold Hearing on Final Rent
and Damages
Relevant for practitioners in residential landlord-tenant litiga-
tion, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 8.01-
128 to increase the amount of time allowed between a hearing de-
termining possession and the hearing determining final rent and
180. H.B. 441, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2016) (enacted as Act of Mar. 1, 2016, ch.
189, 2016 Va. Acts _, _).
181. 290 Va. 226, 776 S.E.2d 793 (2015).
182. H.B. 441, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2016).
183. Act of Mar. 1, 2016, ch. 189, 2016 Va. Acts-, -(codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-229 (Supp. 2016)).
184. Id.
185. Id. (language in italics added in amendment).
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damages.'86 In unlawful detainer actions, the Virginia Code per-
mits a plaintiff to move the court to bifurcate the pending case
between possession and damages. 18 7 The first hearing is solely to
determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the
premises in dispute."' The second hearing, if necessary, then de-
termines the plaintiffs final rent and damages.'89 The practical
purpose of this procedure is that it allows the plaintiff to capture
damages that will almost always accrue after receiving posses-
sion-such as utilities, damage to premises, and additional rent-
in one proceeding. Otherwise, a plaintiff would have to file a sub-
sequent warrant in debt to capture any damages after the hear-
ing. Previously, the Virginia Code required that the second hear-
ing-which is solely as to final rent and damages-had to be held
within ninety days of the hearing on possession. 9' As of July 1,
2016, a plaintiff is allowed up to 120 days between the two hear-
ings, thereby increasing the potential period for capturing dam-
191
ages.
C. General District Court Jurisdiction to Compel Arbitration
Alternative dispute resolution has greatly increased in use in
the last several decades, particularly to avoid the high cost of liti-
gation. 92 Arbitration provisions in contracts, particularly for larg-
er entities, are commonplace if not "stock" provisions (and ironi-
cally the subject of even greater litigation).'93 As a result, courts
are now more often faced with defenses and disputes based on
mandatory arbitration provisions. Thanks to House Bill 641 that
was signed into law on March 1, 2016 and came into effect on Ju-
ly 1, 2016, general district courts in the Commonwealth now have
jurisdiction to refer matters to arbitration. 'T The jurisdictional
186. Act of Mar. 7, 2016, ch. 281, 2016 Va. Acts, - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-128 (Supp. 2016)).
187. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-128 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Supp. 2016).
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-128(B) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
191. Act of Mar. 7, 2016, ch. 281, 2016 Va. Acts.., - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-128(B) (Supp. 2016)).
192. See, e.g., Richard Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 963 (2000).
193. See, e.g., Emily Farinacci, In a Bind: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in the Corpo-
rative Derivative Context, 28 OHIO ST. J. DisP. RESOL. 737, 737-39 (2013).
194. H.B. 641, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2016); Act of Mar. 1, 2016, ch. 181, 2016
Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.016 (Supp. 2016); id. §
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limits naturally still apply, so the amount in controversy must be
$25,000 or less.'95 Previously, general district courts did not have
the power to compel arbitration and would simply have to dismiss
a case without prejudice and instruct (with no power to enforce)
the parties to arbitrate. The general district court's order compel-
ling arbitration can be appealed by either party to the circuit
court for a de novo review.9
D. Statute of Limitations on Implanted Medical Devices
The General Assembly also amended the accrual of a cause of
action provisions in Virginia Code section 8.01-249 as to products
liability cases involving implanted medical devices. 97 Section
8.01-249 now provides that in such actions against a defendant
other than a health care provider, the cause of action shall accrue
"when the person knew or should have known of the injury and
its causal connection to the device."'95 The change will give more
time to plaintiffs whose cause of action otherwise would have ac-
crued when the injury occurred.'99 This change mirrors the accru-
al language in section 8.01-249 regarding product liability actions
involving implanted prosthetic devices for breast augmentation or
reconstruction. 0 '
E. Substituted Service on Registered Agent
The General Assembly increased the number of permissible
methods of service as to registered agents of a corporation. The
General Assembly, by Senate Bill 241, amended Virginia Code
section 8.01-299 to include the following subsection: "[i]f the reg-
istered address of the corporation is a single-family residential
dwelling, by substituted service on the registered agent of the
16.1-77 (Supp. 2016)).
195. Act of Mar. 1, 2016, ch. 181, 2016 Va. Acts , - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-77 (Supp. 2016)).
196. Id.
197. Act of Mar. 11, 2016, ch. 353, 2016 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-249 (Supp. 2016)).
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-230 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Supp. 2016) ("[T]he right of action
shall be deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation period shall begin to run from the
date the injury is sustained in the case of injury to the person.").
200. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-249(7) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
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corporation in the manner of subdivision 2 of § 8.01-296."21 This
will primarily affect small corporations where the registered
agent is the owner or another individual and his or her residen-
tial address is on file with the state corporation commission
(which may also be the mailing address for the business). Person-
al service on such individuals can be difficult. As of July 1, 2016,
parties can use substituted service in such instances. 22 As a re-
fresher, Virginia Code section 8.01-296(2) provides two methods
of substituted service. Instead of personally serving the actual in-
dividual (in this case the registered agent), at the residential ad-
dress a party can serve "any person found there, who is a member
of his family, other than a temporary sojourner or guest, and who
is of the age of 16 years or older."2 °3 Alternatively, a party can
"post[] a copy of such process at the front door or at such other
door as appears to be the main entrance of such place of abode. 2 4
201. Act of Mar. 7, 2016, ch. 270, 2016 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-299 (Supp. 2016)).
202. Id.
203. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-296(2) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
204. Id.
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